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I. Introduction
The binding dispute settlement system of the World Trade Organization (WTO) has been heralded as the 'jewel in the crown' of the multilateral trading system. The establishment of the WTO in 1995 included a new Understanding on the Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU), which contains innovations that resulted in a paradigm shift from General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) trading relations based on economic power and politics to a WTO system based on the rule of law. The resulting increased legality of the WTO was initially hailed to benefi t considerably smaller countries, of which many are developing countries and least-developed countries (LDCs). As Steger and Hainsworth (1998: 225) commented shortly after the creation of the WTO, the shift 'is particularly benefi cial for smaller countries, as without the rules and procedures of the DSU... they would not have the necessary bargaining power vis-à-vis the larger powers'. Despite these perceived benefi ts, data from the last 17 years demonstrate that the vast majority of developing countries have not participated actively in the WTO dispute settlement system (Nottage 2009a: 489-90) . In particular, the Commonwealth small states and LDCs have initiated only two of the 450 WTO disputes to date. The fact that a group of 36 countries, which represents over 20 per cent of the WTO membership, has initiated less than 0.5 per cent of all WTO disputes raises a number of questions that this paper attempts to address.
In particular, Part II of the paper provides the fi rst specifi c evaluation of the participation of Commonwealth small states and LDCs in WTO dispute settlement and poses the question whether that participation should be greater despite those countries' small shares of global trade. Part II highlights that a spectrum of other WTO members, from large wellresourced developed countries to small developing countries, have participated in WTO dispute settlement to a greater extent than those countries' shares of world trade might suggest. The paper therefore queries whether Commonwealth small states and LDCs might also draw greater benefi t from the multilateral trading system if they were to participate more in the dispute settlement system, particularly as, paradoxically, small states and LDCs may be more reliant on WTO dispute settlement than larger countries when confronted with illegal trade barriers. Part III of the paper then analyses whether the limited participation of the Commonwealth small states and LDCs in WTO dispute settlement may be due to the special constraints and limitations they face. Part III.A evaluates the significant human and fi nancial costs that small states and LDCs face when initiating and litigating a WTO dispute. Part III.B then focuses on the problem that many small states lack resources within government and their private sectors to identify and communicate potentially illegal trade barriers to WTO legal experts. Parts III.C and III.D next identify two commonly perceived constraints for small states: the inability of small economies to effectively enforce a favourable ruling and fears of political or economic retaliation from larger countries. The paper notes, however, that these perceived concerns may not arise frequently in practice.
In addition, Parts IV and V of the paper provide thoughts on Commonwealth small state and LDC third-party participation in WTO disputes as well as the untapped potential of using alternative dispute resolution (ADR) to resolve WTO disputes involving small countries.
The paper concludes with certain proposals. It highlights a number of tentative solutions to mitigate the high costs of WTO litigation for Commonwealth small states and LDCs and discusses mechanisms to improve private sector and government capacity to identify and communicate trade barriers to WTO lawyers. It also proposes dialogue and experience-sharing in order to assuage fears with respect to well-publicised retaliation constraints that may not occur frequently in reality. Throughout, the paper draws from specifi c examples and case studies to highlight its major conclusions. In doing so, this paper attempts to set a platform for the second study in this project, by Lorand Bartels (2014) , which addresses concrete ways to improve the access of Commonwealth small states and LDCs to the WTO's dispute settlement system. It might, therefore, be argued that the limited participation of these countries in WTO dispute settlement simply refl ects their limited participation in world trade. As Francois et al. (2008: 4) explain, 'it is highly likely that a country that exports many products to many markets and in large volumes will encounter more illegalities than a country that exports a few products in limited amounts to a few markets.' A number of economic studies confi rm a correlation between a country's share of world trade and its participation in WTO dispute settlement (e.g. Horn et al. 1999; Bown 2005; Bohanes and Garza 2012) . If this criterion were used to evaluate the participation of Commonwealth small states and LDCs in WTO dispute settlement it might be concluded that their participation is 'adequate', as it is more or less in line with their share in global trade (i.e. 0.5 per cent participation as a complainant in all disputes is broadly consistent with a 0.6 per cent participation in global trade). Torres (2012: 9) concludes that this active participation 'enables Latin America to make full use of the tools offered by the multilateral trading system to defend their export markets, which are of crucial importance in their efforts to achieve development through economic growth.' One might query whether the Commonwealth small states and LDCs are doing the same? This practice of other countries at least raises the possibility that Commonwealth small states and LDCs might draw greater benefi ts from the multilateral trading system if they were to participate more in WTO dispute settlement despite their relatively small trading stakes. In fact, paradoxically, small states and LDCs may be more reliant on WTO dispute settlement than larger countries when confronted with illegal trade barriers. As Shaffer (2003a: 15) notes, small developing countries tend to export a narrower array and volume of exports to a relatively small number of markets. As a result, a single trade restriction can have higher relative and per capita stakes for that small and less-diversifi ed economy. Commercial operators within the country may therefore struggle to divert exports to alternative markets. For these reasons, the rapid removal of trade restrictions through WTO dispute settlement can be imperative for companies within small states, precisely because of the limited range and destinations of their exports.
II. Evaluation of the Participation of
For all these reasons, this paper queries whether the limited dispute settlement participation of Commonwealth small states and LDCs is solely attributable to small trading stakes and suggests that it may also be due to the special constraints that these countries face when they attempt to access the WTO dispute settlement system. Part III of this paper provides a critical evaluation of those constraints. The small trade shares and government budgets of Commonwealth small states and LDCs accentuate one of the major constraints that many developing countries face when accessing the WTO dispute settlement system -the human and fi nancial costs of participating in WTO litigation.
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As Bown and Hoekman (2005: 863) observe, developing countries' low trade volumes, often in competitive markets with low profi t margins, 'make it difficult to charge mark-ups to cover any non-economic (i.e. litigation) costs associated with maintaining or enforcing market access rights'. The rationale behind this limitation is that claims involving smaller trade stakes are not offset by smaller litigation costs.
Consequently, as any WTO dispute involving a Commonwealth small state or LDC is likely to involve low levels of trade, the relative costs of litigation will be higher for those countries, especially in light of the high opportunity costs of investing in WTO litigation as opposed to other pressing social needs (Shaffer 2006: 185) .
The costs of WTO litigation can be high
A number of WTO members and commentators argue that the WTO dispute settlement system is 'overly complicated and expensive', resulting in insurmountable 'human resource as well as fi nancial implications' for developing countries (Bown and Hoekman 2005: 889) . 9 Ambassador Bhatia of India has observed that, even for a large developing country, the high costs of WTO litigation are a 'major deterrent' against using the system. Available at: hwww.wto.org/english/forums_e/public_forum08_e/programme_e.htm technical expertise to conduct disputes themselves. Where internal expertise is lacking, governments are required to hire external legal counsel and contract economic and scientifi c evidence at considerable cost.
(a) Legal costs
The cost of hiring private legal counsel to litigate WTO disputes has increased exponentially in recent years. Commentators have estimated that 'a "litigation-only" bill of US$500,000 to an exporter for a market access case is likely to be fairly typical' (Bown and Hoekman 2005: 870) . Legal fees can, of course, be much higher, with reports of fees for parties in panel proceedings in excess of US$10 million (see Nordström and Shaffer 2007: 9) .
These increased legal costs can be attributed, in part, to the multiple stages of WTO dispute settlement under the DSU, whereby challenged measures may be subject to reviews by a panel, the appellate body, an arbitrator determining the reasonable period of time to comply, further reviews to determine compliance, as well as arbitration on the level of suspension of concessions.
11 As a result, it can take several years of litigation to resolve a single WTO dispute. Furthermore, the 500 hundred pages of WTO treaty text and ever-increasing volume of WTO jurisprudence contained in hundreds of panel and appellate body reports means that WTO lawyers competent to litigate in WTO disputes are highly specialised and able to charge premium fees. The binding nature of WTO dispute settlement also means that governments (and the companies behind them) are taking each dispute far more seriously, which seems to lead to more detailed and costly submissions. Finally, it has been observed that the lack of retrospective remedies for businesses affected by illegal protectionist measures gives respondents an incentive to further complicate, hence delay, the dispute settlement process (Busch and Reinhardt 2000) .
(b) Costs of economic and scientifi c inputs
The costs of participation in these multiple stages of WTO dispute settlement are compounded by a trend towards increasingly technical submissions. The WTO agreements that came into effect in 1995 include new legal standards that hinge on detailed scientifi c or economic determinations that were not as central under the GATT. In order to litigate successfully, parties in a dispute often need to provide considerable scientifi c or economic evidence to support their position.
For 13 In these disputes, success requires the input of technical experts that may also need to be contracted externally at additional cost. A lack of technical expertise may explain why developing countries have hardly initiated WTO dispute settlement proceedings under the SPS agreement.
14 In contrast, governments of developed countries have brought a number of disputes under the SPS agreement. 15 This situation is perhaps surprising as a large proportion of the exports of developing countries exports are in agricultural products, and the SPS agreement ensures that trade measures on animals, plants and their products are not applied as disguised restrictions on international trade.
The resource constraints that stem from providing these scientifi c and economic inputs should not be underestimated. Over the last 3 years, WTO members have litigated three signifi cant disputes under the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade. Those disputes tackled behind-the-border non-tariff measures such as a dolphin-safe labelling scheme on tuna, country-of-origin requirements on meat products, and a ban on certain fl avoured tobacco products. 16 In each instance, the panels relied heavily on evidence of a technical nature when making their determinations. In the light of the former WTO director-general's recognition of the 'growing importance' of such non-tariff measures, 17 and their prevalence in the agricultural sector, 18 19 In recognition of the cost constraints faced by developing countries, the ACWL provides its legal services to developing countries for free or at heavily subsidised rates. These services are fi nanced largely from an endowment fund of developed-and developingcountry contributions.
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While legal advice and training are provided for free to developing-country members of the ACWL and all LDCs, support in dispute settlement proceedings is charged according to hourly rates that vary between CHF40 21 and CHF324. The hourly rate applied depends upon the ACWL's categorisation of each developing country based on either its LDC status or share of world trade and income per capita. These dispute settlement fees are subject to ceilings such that the maximum ACWL fee for representation at the consultations, panel and appellate body stages of a WTO dispute would be:
• CHF34,160 for an LDC (at an hourly rate of CHF40);
• CHF138,146 for a 'category C' ACWL member (at an hourly rate of CHF162); and • CHF207,522 for a 'category B' ACWL member (at an hourly rate of CHF243).
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Consequently, the ACWL's capped dispute settlement fees are likely to be considerably less than those ordinarily charged by commercial law fi rms.
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As a result of this fee structure, it has been commented that the ACWL 'has largely addressed many of the capacity constraints' faced by developing countries in WTO dispute settlement procedures (Abbot 2007. See also Bown and Hoekman 2005: 875) . Pertinently, the economists Bown and McCulloch (2009: 20-2) have demonstrated that the reduced costs of ACWL legal representation in WTO litigation correlates with developing-country ACWL members bringing disputes over considerably lower values of lost trade than non-ACWL member developing countries. This fi nding is signifi cant, as it confi rms that when legal costs are reduced, developing countries have brought WTO 19 As of November 2012, the services of the ACWL were available to the 31 developing countries that had become members of the ACWL and the 43 LDCs that were WTO members or in the process of acceding to the WTO. See ACWL webpage at http://www.acwl.ch. 20 The 11 developed-country ACWL members that have made contributions to the ACWL are not entitled to its services. LDCs are exempt from the requirement to make a fi nancial contribution to the endowment fund. www.acwl.ch. 21 CHF refers to the Swiss Franc. 22 Of the 36 Commonwealth small states and LDCs 11 are LDCs, 12 fall into 'category C' and nine fall into 'category B'. Cyprus would be the only 'category A' ACWL member and would face a maximum dispute settlement fee of CHF276,969. 23 One commentator suggests that 'developing countries can face fees ranging from US$200 to US$600 (or more) an hour when they hire private law fi rms to advise and represent them in WTO cases' (Shaffer 2003: 16 As with ACWL dispute settlement fees, the ACWL accession fee varies according to the ACWL's categorisation of each developing country based on its share of world trade and income per capita. Thus, the 12 Commonwealth small states that fall into the ACWL's 'category C' would normally need to pay an accession fee of CHF81,000 and the nine Commonwealth small states that fall into the ACWL's 'category B' would probably need to pay an accession fee of CHF162,000 before they could avail of the ACWL's services. 24 However, only two of these 21 non-LDC Commonwealth small states haveacceded to the ACWL: Mauritius in 2003 and Seychelles in 2012. As a result, 19 of the non-LDC Commonwealth small states are currently not eligible for the ACWL's free legal advice or subsidised legal support in dispute settlement proceedings. It is unclear why these countries have not acceded to the ACWL when 31 other developing countries have considered it worthwhile. One possible explanation is that their small populations, and minute disaggregated global trade shares, mean that it may be diffi cult for their governments to justify the upfront budgetary outlay for ACWL accession in the absence of an imminent WTO dispute. This possible explanation is accentuated by the fact that many Commonwealth small states have relatively high per capita incomes despite their small populations and, consequently, are likely to face the ACWL 'category B' accession fee. The most extreme example is St Kitts and Nevis with a population of only 52,000 but a likely ACWL accession fee of CHF162,000.
24 These accession fees can be paid in instalments over 5 years. The precise terms and conditions for accession to the ACWL, including the accession fee, are negotiated between the ACWL general assembly and the country seeking to accede. The quoted accession fees were those paid by the original acceding members and have been applied, to date, to all subsequent acceding developing countries.
For these Commonwealth small states, failure to accede to the ACWL and consequently access free or low-cost WTO legal services on the basis of a perception of a small chance that their country would initiate a WTO dispute may result in a 'selffulfi lling prophecy'. 25 As noted above, statistics confi rm that it was only once countries had access to the ACWL's subsidised legal services that they brought disputes over smaller trade shares. Thus, until the legal cost constraint has been addressed it is diffi cult to predict what disputes Commonwealth small states might bring.
Tentative solutions looking forwards
Despite the creation of the ACWL, there have been a number of other proposals in the context of the DSU review negotiations to address the cost constraints faced by developing countries when accessing the WTO dispute settlement system (Bartels 2014 26 ). One proposal put forward by a coalition of developing countries has been a separate dispute settlement fund established within the WTO (Bartels 2014) .
Some have queried why a separate fund would be necessary in the light of the existence of the ACWL. 27 As highlighted above, one explanation might be the ACWL accession fees that might be difficult for countries with small populations to justify. Although these accession fees were calibrated to take into account differences between developing countries, the relatively small number of accessions from low-population Commonwealth small states might indicate that further thinking and solutions are required. One solution, for instance, might be for aid agencies to pay the ACWL accession fees of these countries. Another solution, perhaps, would be for the ACWL general assembly to reconsider the accession conditions for countries that are considered 'small and vulnerable economies' within the WTO.
28 A counter-argument might be that it is simply a question of educating Commonwealth small states on the value of ACWL accession, not just for dispute settlement support, but also for its free legal advisory and training services. 29 Certainly, these ACWL services were deemed suffi cient for Seychelles, with a population of only 84,000, to accede in 2013 as a 'category B' ACWL member and for Mauritius to do so in 2003.
A further important consideration is that any solution to mitigate the costs of 25 A self-fulfi lling prophecy is a prediction that directly or indirectly causes itself to become true by the very terms of the prophecy itself. The twentieth-century sociologist Robert K. 31 It has been suggested by some that developing countries should request the assistance of development agencies and foundations to assist them in identifying trade barriers faced by their private sectors (Shaffer 2006: 184) . Perhaps the 30 I have borrowed this phrase from Gregory Shaffer who pioneered most of the work in this area (Shaffer 2006 
There have been a number of initiatives in recent years that have attempted to address the domestic constraints that developing countries face to identify and communicate potential claims to WTO experts. In some Commonwealth small states, such as Barbados, the government has actively supported business associations to develop the necessary skills to infl uence trade policy and regularly solicits the input of the private sector on trade matters through a dedicated 'private sector trade team' (Jones et al. 2010: 39-40) . Furthermore, since 2003, the International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development (ICTSD) has evaluated various developing countries' experiences in the trade area in an attempt to discern certain best-practices in enhancing public-private partnerships concerning trade barriers (see, for example Shaffer and Melendez-Ortiz 2010). These have been communicated through regional dialogues with both government offi cials and representatives of the private sector. Another institution that is focused on building private-sector awareness in this area is the International Trade Centre, in particular its Business and Trade Policy Unit. Educating the private sector about the WTO, the remedies it provides, and the appropriate contact points within national governments that can enforce market access commitments are essential.
Commonwealth small states and LDCs that wish to deepen the domestic capacity of their private sectors and government offi cials to identify and communicate potentially WTO-inconsistent trade barriers to WTO lawyers for evaluation may wish to avail themselves of the assistance of these organisations. This appears to be an area where the Commonwealth Secretariat is ideally placed to assist in the light of its specifi c work programmes on publicprivate partnerships and small states.
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C. De-bunking the myth that countries need large trade shares in order to achieve compliance in WTO disputes It has often been observed that a fundamental constraint limiting the utility of the WTO dispute settlement system for developing countries is the inability for many of them to enforce positive rulings against larger non-complying WTO members. The DSU permits retaliation against non-complying WTO members through the suspension of trade concessions or obligations as well as countermeasures.
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The limitation of these retaliation rules, from a Commonwealth small state and LDC perspective, is that countries with small domestic markets are unlikely to be able to impose suffi cient economic or political losses through trade sanctions within the larger WTO members to generate the requisite pressure to induce compliance. This limitation has led some commentators to characterise the WTO's retaliation rules as 'virtually meaningless' (Footer 2001: 94) for small countries and to a common perception that it is 'a waste of time and money for developing countries to invoke the WTO's dispute settlement procedures against industrialised countries' because 'the developing country has no effective way to enforce the ruling.'
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The retaliation request of Antigua and Barbuda, one of the smallest WTO members with approximately 90,000 inhabitants, against US in the United States -Gambling dispute provides an illustration of retaliation diffi culties where there is an asymmetry in market size. As Antigua and Barbuda stated in its request for retaliation, 'ceasing all trade whatsoever with the United States (approximately US$180 million annually, or less than 0.02 per cent of all exports from the United States) would have virtually no impact on the economy of the United States, which could easily shift such a relatively small volume of trade elsewhere.' 35 A similar statement was made by the arbitrator examining the ability of Ecuador to effectively retaliate against the EU by withdrawing tariff concessions in the European CommunitiesBananas disputes. Ecuador imports less than 0.1 per cent of total EU exports, leading the arbitrator to observe that 'given the fact that Ecuador, as a small developing country, only accounts for a negligible proportion of the [EU]'s exports of these products, the suspension of concessions is unlikely to have any signifi cant effect on demand for these [EU] exports.' 36 The arbitrator queried whether the objective of inducing compliance 'may ever be achieved where a great imbalance in terms of trade volume and economic power exists between the complaining party seeking suspension and the other party.' 37 Furthermore, it has been observed that '[p] erhaps the biggest disadvantage of WTO sanctions is that they bite the country imposing the sanction' (Charnovitz 2002: 621) . If one subscribes to the benefi ts of trade liberalisation it makes sense that retaliation through trade barriers will be a suboptimal policy that amounts to 'shooting oneself in the foot' (Bronkers 33 Article 22 of the DSU and articles 4.10 and 7.9 of the SCM Agreement. This paper refers to these enforcement options, collectively, as 'retaliation rules'. 34 This common perception is referred to, and then critiqued, in Hudec (2002: 81 and Van den Brock 2006: 103) . This concern with WTO retaliation was also raised by Antigua and Barbuda in its request for retaliation against US. Antigua and Barbuda are small islands with negligible natural resources, making them heavily reliant on imports. As 50 per cent of those imports are from US, Antigua and Barbuda expressed concern that retaliating through import restrictions would have a 'disproportionate adverse impact on Antigua and Barbuda by making these products and services materially more expensive to the citizens of the country.' 38 Retaliatory restrictions on goods or services from US were argued to have 'a much greater negative impact on Antigua and Barbuda than it would on the United States.' 39 Similarly, the arbitrator examining Ecuador's request for retaliation against the EU in EC -Bananas noted that 'in situations where the complaining party is highly dependent on imports from the other party, it may happen that the suspension of certain concessions or certain other obligations entails more harmful effects for the party seeking suspension of concessions than for the other party.' 40 The positions articulated by Antigua and Barbuda and Ecuador regarding the weaknesses of the WTO retaliation rules for developing countries are sound. They have led some to the conclusion that 'countermeasures are a more or less ineffective instrument in the hands of "smaller" players' (Bagwell et al. 2004: 14-15) and that 'as a practical matter' trade sanctions 'can probably only be adopted by developed country Members, or large, advanced developing countries' (Renouf 2005: 118).
1. Arguments why Commonwealth small states and LDCs are likely to obtain compliance from even large countries if they succeed in WTO dispute settlement
While not disputing that the WTO's retaliation rules are likely to be ineffective if applied by Commonwealth small states and LDCs against a larger non-complying country, this reality ought to be tempered by the fact that in the vast majority of WTO disputes to date, compliance has occurred. This practice suggests that an inability to retaliate effectively will often remain a theoretical constraint and should not automatically deter Commonwealth small states and LDCs from using the WTO dispute settlement system.
Evaluations of the GATT and WTO dispute settlement data demonstrate high rates of compliance with dispute settlement rulings. One analysis of the fi rst 10 years of the WTO dispute settlement system indicates a successful implementation rate of adopted panel and appellate body reports of 83 per cent (Davey 2005: 46-8) . Only 10 of the 181 initiated disputes examined in that analysis resulted in no implementation or disagreement over implementation (Davey 2005: 47) . A separate study, covering the period until March 2007, describes the 'generally positive record of Members in complying with adverse rulings' (Wilson 2007: 397 found violations of WTO law, and that in 'virtually all of these cases the WTO Member found to be in violation indicated its intention to bring itself into compliance and the record indicates that in most cases it has already done so' (Wilson 2007) .
A key fi nding for the Commonwealth small states and LDCs is that these high compliance rates are not limited to those WTO disputes brought by large countries. Similar compliance rates have been observed when smaller and developing countries have obtained favourable rulings. As one study found:
WTO dispute settlement experience to date does not suggest that responding Members have a manifestly worse record of compliance with [Dispute Settlement Body] DSB rulings in cases where the complaining Member was a small or developing country than in cases where the complaining Member was another type of developing country or developed country. (Malacrida 2008:20) This practice of high compliance with WTO dispute settlement rulings, even when the complainant was a small developing country, suggests that the capacity to retaliate effectively is often not a signifi cant factor for government compliance with adverse rulings. In the words of Hudec (2002: 81) , 'enforcement is a more complex process than mere retaliation', and governments often comply with dispute settlement rulings for reasons other than a fear of retaliation.
These other factors include that: (i) some parts of the defendant government and its constituents usually want the conduct found inconsistent with WTO law to be removed simply because it is good policy; (ii) the defendant government is likely to see a long-term value in preserving the legitimacy of the legal system for when it may need to rely on it for its own purposes; and (iii) the shaming pressure caused by other governments wishing to preserve the legitimacy of the legal system should not be underestimated (Hudec 2002: 82-3) .
Furthermore, WTO practice demonstrates that the high compliance rates observed in WTO dispute settlement have not required members to regularly request or impose retaliatory measures. Of the 60 WTO disputes where retaliation was possible, as the reasonable period of time to comply had expired without compliance being achieved, members requested the right to retaliate only in 17 disputes and imposed retaliatory measures only in fi ve (Nottage 2009b: 85) . Thus, while the WTO dispute settlement body has authorised retaliation on occasion, it is seems fair to say that 'retaliation has been the exception rather than the rule' (Nottage 2009b) . From these fi gures, one might extrapolate that, in the vast majority of disputes, the catalyst for compliance does not appear to have been the threat of retaliation.
Nonetheless, on those rare occasions where a defendant is a larger economy and does not voluntarily comply with adverse rulings, the weaknesses of WTO retaliation rules for small developing countries are real and will undermine the utility of WTO dispute settlement. For this reason, current DSU review negotiations proposals, as well as the potential for cross-retaliation, deserve continuing attention (Bartels 2014 : topic 3).
Tentative solutions looking forwards
As noted above, in the majority of WTO disputes, compliance has occurred even when small developing countries with little capacity to retaliate have been successful complainants. This practice suggests that an inability to retaliate effectively will often remain a theoretical constraint. This suggests that one solution to this perceived limitation of the WTO dispute settlement system is to communicate these facts to Commonwealth small states and LDCs in a manner that they should not be automatically deterred from initiating WTO dispute settlement proceedings on this basis alone.
D. The unquantifi able constraint -fears of political or economic retaliation
The special aid and trade relationships that Commonwealth small states and LDCs have with Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development countries
Some commentators have noted that developing and least-developed countries may be unwilling to initiate WTO dispute settlement proceedings against developed countries due to their particular vulnerability to 'retaliation' in other areas such as development assistance or preferential market access (Bown and Hoekman 2005: 863) . It has been observed that 'there may be little that a small developing country can do to counter threats to withdraw preferential tariff benefi ts or foreign aid ... were the country to challenge a trade measure' (Shaffer 2006: 193) .
It is undeniable that the Commonwealth's small states and LDCs are particularly dependent upon aid and trade preferences granted by developed and, increasingly, large developing countries. It is also undeniable that many offi cials from these small states perceive that they will be subject to possible reprisals in these areas if they were to initiate a WTO dispute. A 2011 study that analysed the perceptions of Commonwealth small states' trade negotiators, based on interviews with more than 80 trade negotiators from 30 small states, confi rms that that these offi cials commonly 'perceive themselves to be operating under a high level of threat from large states' including 'fears of possible aid or trade reprisals' which 'severely constrains … their determination to persist' with offensive requests on trade matters (Jones et al. 2010: 45) .
Nonetheless, as explained below, it is not clear that Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries would in fact apply political and economic pressures on a Commonwealth small state or LDC were it to initiate a WTO dispute.
2. The lack of evidence that OECD countries apply political or economic pressure on countries that initiate WTO disputes It is impossible to determine objectively whether aid or preferential trade retaliation would be applied by OECD countries against Commonwealth small states or LDCs were they to initiate WTO disputes, as so few small states, and only one LDC, have brought WTO dispute settlement proceedings to date.
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There are, however, certain arguments why such retaliation is unlikely to be 41 Shaffer (2006: 193) states that threats of this nature have been 'confi rmed in a number of interviews, including with a former member of USTR' . In contrast, Abbott (2007: 14) notes that 'there is not much empirical evidence that this has actually happened'. applied in reality. First, increasingly, developed-country governments' aid and trade portfolios are managed by separate ministries in an intentional effort to de-link these two spheres. Second, there is very little evidence that such political or economic retaliation has been applied by WTO members in the 450 disputes initiated to date. Third, although this cannot be empirically proven, the number of WTO disputes between countries with close political, economic and security relationships over the last 17 years appears to suggest that, for the main users of the system, initiating a WTO dispute is seen fi rst and foremost as a means to settle a discrete commercial matter as opposed to an aggressive political action that would warrant reprisals in other spheres of the countries' bilateral relations. Nevertheless, it is apparent that offi cials in many small states and LDCs perceive that retaliation on a political, aid or preferential market access level might fl ow from the initiation of a WTO dispute. This in turn may have a chilling effect on their participation. Romano (2002: 551-2) has written that of all the factors affecting the decision to litigate 'perhaps the most fundamental one, is … the willingness to utilise international judicial bodies.'
Case study: the experience of the cotton-producing LDCs in the United States -Upland Cotton dispute
On certain occasions, the lack of participation of certain developing countries in dispute settlement activity may have been a rational decision not to dedicate resources to a dispute that is already being litigated by another WTO member. Where restrictive measures are applied to imports of all origins, or relate to subsidies that affect the trade a number of WTO members, there is a degree of logic behind smaller WTO members not actively participating in disputes initiated by other WTO members and consciously 'free-riding' on the implementation of positive rulings through the operation of the various most-favoured nation clauses of the WTO agreements. As this case study demonstrates, however, this approach has certain potential pitfalls.
In 2003, Brazil initiated WTO dispute settlement proceedings against US with respect to a range of agricultural subsidies provided to US' cotton producers. Four African LDCs (Benin, Burkina Faso, Chad and Mali (the 'Cotton-4')), also had a commercial interest in challenging these subsidies which were suppressing the global price for their cotton. Nonetheless, they decided either to not participate or to limit their participation to that of third parties. As the Cotton-4 LDCs did not participate as complainants in this dispute, they did not obtain the same legal rights as Brazil under the DSU to apply countermeasures against US. As a consequence, their case to be included in the settlement negotiations, and for a share of US' annual payments to cotton producers in Brazil, is considerably weaker than that of Brazil. This is perhaps why the settlement between Brazil and US does not explicitly guarantee any funds to the Cotton-4 LDCs. 44 The moral of this story is that if a small state or LDC does not participate in a WTO dispute as a main party, perhaps due to retaliation fears associated with such participation, it will not obtain the same rights as complaining parties to impose countermeasures pursuant to the DSU which may, in certain instances, have implications for any settlement agreement.
Tentative solutions looking forwards
Despite a common perception that small states and LDCs that initiate WTO disputes against larger countries are likely to be subject to retaliation on political, aid or preferential market access levels, there is little evidence that such pressures would be applied in reality.
It may be worthwhile for the Commonwealth countries of Antigua and Barbuda and Bangladesh to communicate their experiences on this specifi c issue to other Commonwealth small states and LDCs. As noted, Bangladesh initiated a WTO dispute against its largest regional neighbour, India, and Antigua and Barbuda launched a WTO dispute against US. They are in an ideal position to explain whether initiating these disputes resulted in political or economic retaliation by the larger country subject to the complaint. If not, such a dialogue may well assuage the fears that decisionmakers in other Commonwealth small states and LDCs often refer to but that may be unlikely to eventuate in practice. Participation as a third party is seen as useful for the main users of the WTO dispute settlement system. For instance, the EU, US and China are third parties in almost all WTO disputes, which suggests a belief that third parties are able infl uence the outcomes of disputes.
IV. Thoughts on
For the Commonwealth small states and LDCs, participation as a third party entails obvious resource constraints. Nonetheless, the human and fi nancial costs are far less than participating as a complainant or respondent, as third parties are under no obligation to make any written or oral submissions and can limit any submissions they do make to those issues of principal concern. In the EC -Bananas and ECExport Subsidies on Sugar disputes, for instance, many Commonwealth small state third party submissions focused on the economic and social implications of removal of the preferences and subsidy schemes as opposed to their legality.
The value of third-party participation as a learning exercise
Another benefi t of third-party participation is that it provides a unique means to gain exposure to, and familiarity with, the WTO dispute settlement system. As such, third-party participation can serve as a valuable training tool for delegates from Commonwealth small states and LDCs who wish to learn how the WTO dispute settlement system operates in practice. Participation as a third party need not be daunting, as a country need not make submissions and need not take sides in the dispute. If a country desires to take a more active role, however, even if participating solely for training purposes, it may be worth noting that the ACWL recently changed its rules so that it is able to represent any LDC, as a third party, for free in a WTO dispute.
V. Thoughts on the untapped potential of alternative dispute resolution for Commonwealth small states and LDCs The WTO's DSU permits WTO members to resolve their trade disputes through ADR mechanisms that differ from normal panel and appellate body procedures.
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In particular, Article 5 of the DSU refers to the possibility of availing of 'good offi ces, conciliation and mediation', while Article 25 of the DSU permits members to resolve disputes through 'arbitration'. These mechanisms provide the key advantage that they permit WTO members to resolve disputes expeditiously compared 46 In dispute settlement theory, a distinction is typically made between legal means of dispute resolution and diplomatic means of dispute resolution. Diplomatic means of dispute resolution include so-called ADR mechanisms, such as good offi ces, conciliation and mediation and are characterised by nonbinding decisions based on the parties' underlying interests. Legal means of dispute resolution include litigation, and are characterised by a binding decision based on the law. Technically, arbitration falls within the category of the legal means of dispute resolution as it results in a binding decision. However, it is considered part of ADR for the purposes of this paper, as it is an 'alternative' to the dominant WTO dispute resolution practice of panel and appellate body litigation.
with the longer timeframes required for panels and the appellate body to complete their determinations. Expeditious WTO dispute settlement through ADR could be particularly attractive to Commonwealth small states and LDCs. The faster a WTO dispute is resolved the lower the legal fees. Indeed, on those few occasions where WTO members have opted to use ADR to resolve their WTO trade disputes, the rulings were issued extremely quickly. 47 The 2001 Copyright Arbitration pursuant to Article 25 of the DSU, 48 the 2005 sui generis Banana Tariff Arbitrations, 49 and the WTO Canned Tuna Mediation 50 illustrate this point. It is a curiosity that at a time when the WTO dispute settlement system's panel and appellate body procedures have been subject to criticism for the time it takes to complete proceedings (Kennedy 2011) , these ADR options have been rarely invoked. In contrast, domestic legal systems and private parties in international commercial disputes are increasingly turning to ADR in order to avoid lengthy and expensive litigation. This trend towards ADR outside the WTO is particularly clear in the context of private international commercial disputes where arbitration has superseded litigation as the preferred means of dispute settlement (Nottage and Bohanes 2007: 213) .
One explanation why ADR has rarely been invoked in the WTO is that, in contrast to panel and appellate body proceedings, it requires voluntary agreement by both parties. A respondent may not be comfortable agreeing to an expedited procedure for a range of reasons, including domestic industry pressures to maintain a protectionist measure for as long as possible or not wishing to be seen by domestic constituents as conceding too easily through a mediated settlement.
However, few commentators are aware that the normal limitation that ADR pursuant to Articles 5 and 25 of the DSU is only available 'if the parties to the dispute so agree' does not apply when a developing country or LDC invokes certain special ADR procedures. Article 3.12 of the DSU gives any developing country 'the right to invoke' special 1966 Procedures in lieu of standard panel procedures in any dispute against a developed country. 51 Those 1966 Procedures in turn mandate that the WTO director-general 'shall consult' with the parties through his good offi ces. In effect, these special procedures require the WTO director-general to provide good offi ces at the request of any developing country involved in a dispute with a developed country. Furthermore, Article 24.2 of the DSU provides that the WTO director-general 'shall … offer' good offi ces, conciliation and mediation in any dispute involving an LDC.
These special DSU provisions provide a unique opportunity for Commonwealth small states and LDCs to invoke expeditious ADR procedures to resolve their WTO disputes. The track-record of these procedures is impressive. 52 That fi nal agreement is considered to have ended, once and for all, 'one of the most technically complex, politically sensitive and commercially meaningful legal disputes ever brought to the WTO' (Nottage 2010; WTO 2012b) .
To conclude, ADR as a means of WTO dispute settlement has enormous untapped potential. It has been highly effective on those rare occasions where it has been utilised and there seems little reason why Commonwealth small states and LDCs should not consider its use if they were to initiate WTO disputes in the future. For similar reasons, Commonwealth small states and LDCs should support efforts in other WTO bodies to facilitate rapid, interest-based, solutions to trade barriers.
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VI. Conclusion and potential next steps
The WTO's dispute settlement mechanism has the potential to be of considerable benefi t for small developing countries. It permits even the smallest and weakest economic powers to enforce the rules under which they trade and therefore provides unprecedented security and predictability in their trading relations.
Despite these potential benefi ts, this paper demonstrates that the 36 Commonwealth small states and LDCs have initiated a mere 0.5 per cent of all WTO disputes. While this share of WTO disputes is in line with the Commonwealth small states' and LDCs' small share of global trade, the paper highlights that a number of other countries, from wellresourced developed countries to small developing countries, have found it worthwhile to participate in WTO disputes to a greater extent than their world trade shares.
For that reason, the paper queries whether the limited participation of Commonwealth small states and LDCs in WTO disputes is not solely attributable to their small trading stakes, but due to the special constraints these countries face when they attempt to access the WTO dispute settlement system. The paper critically evaluates a number of those constraints and reaches the following tentative conclusions on how to improve Commonwealth small state and LDC participation in WTO dispute settlement in the future:
1) It is critical that Commonwealth small states and LDCs have costeffective access to lawyers and technical experts able to represent them in WTO disputes. Data confi rm that when developing countries have access to subsidised legal services they bring WTO disputes over considerably lower values of lost trade. Unfortunately, the majority of non-LDC Commonwealth small states has not joined the ACWL, which was created to address this legal cost constraint. Creative thinking is required on how these countries could access subsidised legal services, whether through facilitated ACWL accession or through other proposals in the ongoing DSU review negotiations. 2) Access to subsidised WTO lawyers will be of little use unless Commonwealth small states and LDCs improve their domestic capacity to identify and communicate potentially inconsistent trade barriers to relevant legal experts. Strengthening public-private partnerships on trade barriers has been effective in a number of other countries and could be replicated in Commonwealth small states and LDCs with the technical assistance of various organisations that are working in this area.
3) The inability of most small developing countries to enforce WTO dispute settlement rulings through trade sanctions will often remain a theoretical constraint and should not overly deter Commonwealth small states and LDCs from using the WTO dispute settlement system. Nonetheless, to address those rare occasions where countries do not voluntarily comply with dispute settlement rulings, cross-retaliation and the compliance proposals in the current DSU review negotiations deserve continuing attention. 4) There is no evidence that OECD or large developing countries would apply retaliation on a political, aid or preferential market access level were a Commonwealth small state or LDC to initiate a WTO dispute against one of them. In order to assuage this widely-perceived fear, Antigua and Barbuda and Bangladesh may wish to share their experiences on this specifi c concern, as complainants, with other Commonwealth small states and LDCs. 5) The participation of Commonwealth small states and LDCs in disputes as third parties should be encouraged, not only to convey views in disputes of special interest, but also as a means to gain familiarity with how the WTO dispute settlement system operates in practice. 6) Commonwealth small states and LDCs should seriously consider availing of the ADR options provided under the DSU to resolve their trade disputes. On the rare occasions that these alternative mechanisms have been utilised they have been effective, expeditious and cost-effective.
Despite the relatively small shares of global trade of Commonwealth small states and LDCs, providing these countries with the capacity to enforce their legal rights through the WTO dispute settlement system is important. Building that capacity to litigate is likely to also permit Commonwealth small states and LDCs to more effectively settle trade-frictions 'outside court' but 'in the shadow of the law' (Shaffer 2003a: 6) . It is hoped that this paper has highlighted a number of areas for further work to improve the participation of Commonwealth small states and LDCs in the new, legalised, multilateral trading system where, indeed, 'right perseveres over might' (Gappah and LacarteMuro 2001: 401) .
